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Abstract 
This paper studies the role of intrinsic motivation, reputation, and reciprocity in driving open source 
software innovation. Unlike previous literature based on survey data, we exploit the observed pattern 
of contributions - the .revealed preference. of developers - to infer the underlying incentives driving 
the decision to contribute source code. Using detailed information on code contributions and project 
membership, we classify software developers into distinct types and study how contributions from 
each developer type vary according to the open source license type and other project characteristics. 
We find that developers strongly sort by license type, project size, and corporate sponsorship, and that 
reciprocity is important only for a small subset of projects. We also show that contributions have a 
substantial impact on the performance of open source projects. 
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1. Introduction
This paper studies how motivations and sorting behavior a¤ect innovation in open source software. In
particular, we study the decision of independent developers to contribute code to di¤erent types of open
source projects, and the impact of these contributions on project performance.
In open source software (OSS), the source code is available for public use and development under
specic conditions which depend on the license governing the project. Programmers who contribute to
open source are typically unpaid, though corporate sponsorship and nancing have increased sharply in
recent years. This raises an important question: How is open source innovation sustained in the face of
free-rider problems and in the absence of direct monetary compensation? This is a central issue not only
for the software sector, but also for other areas in which open commonsproduction has been proposed,
including databases, biotechnology, and nanotechnology.1
Management and economic scholars have studied this question and have proposed four broad types of
theoretical explanations for the paradox. First, developers may be intrinsically motivated to contribute by
their strong identication with the ideologyunderlying the open source movement (Raymond, 2001).2
Second, code contribution and active participation in the OS community may enhance reputation via
greater peer recognition (Raymond, 2001) or commercial rewards in the labor market (Lerner and Tirole,
2001, 2002; Johnson, 2002, 2004). Third, developers may expect to gain later from reciprocal contribu-
tions from projects to which they have previously contributed (Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003). Fourth,
developers may also enjoy(get utility value) from participation (Shah, 2006). For such hobbyists,the
marginal utility of e¤ort may be positive, at least over some range of e¤ort (Kreps, 1997; Glazer, 2004).
These explanations involve varying levels of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, which have been treated
empirically in a number of studies within an OS setting. Though these studies have provided evidence
for diverse motivations, they share two important limitations. First, prior works are typically based on
relatively small samples of contributors to open source projects (Haruvy, Wu, and Chakravarty, 2003;
Hertel, Krishnan, and Slaughter, 2003). The second, and more important limitation, is that they rely
exclusively on what programmers say their motivations are, without any direct way to corroborate these
announced preferences. 3
The strategy of this paper is to utilize revealed preferences, as captured by observed code contributions,
1Good general discussions of open source in software and other areas are available in Lerner and Tirole (2005) and Maurer
and Scotchmer (2006). For a recent book arguing the case for open source in biotechnology, see Hope (2008), and on
nanotechnology, Bruns (2001).
2The original open source license that embodies this view is the general purpose license (GPL), which requires that the
source code and any subsequent code that builds on it or embodies it must remain open source.
3One notable exception is Hann, Roberts, Slaughter, and Fielding (2004), who test the labor market hypothesis of Lerner
and Tirole (2002) by studying the relationship between wages of developers and their contributions to the Apache OSS
project. They nd that wages are related to contributors ranking by the Apache Foundation, but not to the volume of
their contributions, suggesting that contributions may be motivated more by labor market signaling than by human capital
accumulation.
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in order to try to quantify how reputation, reciprocity, utility, and intrinsic motivations each drive open
source innovation. Our empirical analysis of code contributions to OSS projects is based on a large-scale
dataset with detailed information on both the contributing and receiving projects. Each contribution
includes a dyad consisting of a contributing project, where the contributor is a registered member, and a
receiving project to which the code is submitted. The distinction between the contributing and receiving
projects is central to our empirical analysis of sorting, because we seek to establish whether developers af-
liated with certain types of contributing projects systematically target certain kinds of receiving projects.
The key variation comes from the fact that projects vary in the degree to which their licenses are open,
in the spirit of open source. Though open, unrestricted access was the original driving force behind the
free softwaremovement (Raymond, 2001), many projects now incorporate OSS contributions under a
variety of licenses that allow for the source code to be used in proprietary ways that limit terms of use (for
discussion, see Lerner and Schankerman, 2010). For ease of exposition, we refer to the latter as closed
projects.
To study this sorting, we exploit characteristics of the projects such as the license type, size, pro-
gramming language, operating system, and intended audience. We study the empirical determinants of
contributions by focusing on four distinct groups of developers, whose prole we infer based on to the
types of open source license which govern the contributing project with which they are a¢ liated: open,
closed, mixed, and anonymous. We investigate how the pattern of contributions from each developer type
varies across the various characteristics of the contributing-receiving project dyads. The key innovation
in our approach is that we exploit the observed pattern of contributions the revealed preferencesof
developers to infer the underlying incentives.
Our econometric approach is to aggregate code contributions into cells dened by a set of detailed
characteristics of the contributing developers and receiving projects, and then to use these cells as the
observations in the estimation procedure. We then explore how the likelihood of code contribution varies
by the likely motivation of the contributing developer, and the expected potential intrinsic or extrinsic
reward that is associated with the specic bundle of receiving project characteristics. The key identica-
tion assumption in this paper is that the characteristics of contributing and receiving projects (such as
license type) are exogenous with respect to the decisions of individual developers to contribute. The main
identication concern with this approach would be unobserved developer or project heterogeneity which
may be correlated both with the level of contributions and some of the characteristics of the contributing
or receiving project. However, because our focus is on the interactions between the contributing developer
type and project characteristics (not on the level e¤ects of these characteristics), such heterogeneity would
induce bias only if it is correlated with these interactions, which is much less likely. For example, code
contributions are likely to be a¤ected by the unobserved quality of the contributing developer. However,
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while this unobserved quality would a¤ect her level of contributions, there is no reason to expect that it
would a¤ect the distribution of her contributions in relation to project characteristics.
The empirical ndings in this paper show that developers seem to strongly sort on a variety of ob-
served project characteristics. We interpret this as consistent with the view that software developers are
heterogeneous with respect to their motivations. First, we nd assortative matching on the project license
type. Open contributors almost exclusively contribute to projects with open licenses, indicating an im-
portant role for motivated agentsdevelopers dedicated to the ideology of the open source movement.
Closed contributors primarily contribute to projects with closed (more commercial) licenses. If developers
understand that such matching occurs, this nding is consistent with the reputation incentive they go
where reputation gains are most likely to be obtained.
Second, contributors from closed projects are more likely to contribute to larger projects and to those
that are sponsored by corporations. This evidence supports the view that labor market reputation (career
concern) plays an important role, as emphasized by Lerner and Tirole (2002). At the same time, however,
we also nd that, to a lesser extent, the size of the receiving project matters for other developer types.
This indicates that the peer recognition motive also plays a role.
Third, open contributors are much more likely to contribute to projects aimed at end users (e.g.,
computer games), while closed contributors target developer-oriented (e.g., programming tool) projects.
This is potentially important since the development of software tools is the basic researchthat is critical
to the long-run sustainability of the sector. These ndings also suggest that open source development
by intrinsically motivated agents is more of a substitute for proprietary software innovation on the end-
product side.4 All these three ndings on sorting behavior are robust to various empirical specications
including a wide range of control variables.
Fourth, we nd that reciprocity plays a limited role in sustaining innovation. Developers are more likely
to contribute to projects from which they have previously received contributions, controlling for various
observed project characteristics. Reciprocity is more common among closed (commercially oriented)
developers than for open developers (motivated agents). This suggests that reciprocity is associated more
with building reputations than with intrinsic motivation. Relatedly, the vast majority of projects exhibit
no reciprocal contributions. But while we observe reciprocity in only a small percentage of projects,
reciprocal contributions account for a large fraction of the contributions for those projects.
Finally, we empirically examine the relationship between project performance and the contributions
received from project-member developers versus non-members. We show that both internal (member)
and external contributions strongly a¤ect project performance, but the impact of contributions by non-
members is much larger. Interestingly, while sorting strongly a¤ects the ow of contributions from di¤erent
4 It is important to note that our data set does not include the Linux open source project, which is a widely used operating
system.
4
developer types to projects, we nd no di¤erences in the impacts of these di¤erent (external) contributions
on project performance. That is, sorting behavior by developers a¤ects the quantity, but not the quality,
of contributions.
Our ndings that motivations are heterogenous, and induce sorting behavior, should also be relevant
for theories about employment contract design beyond the OSS context. Principal agency theory, with
its focus on extrinsic rewards, has been the dominant paradigm for thinking about employment contracts.
But in the last ten years a number of studies have begun to explore the interaction between intrinsic and
extrinsic motivations and its implications for optimal contracting.5 This literature shows that optimal
incentives may depend strongly on the form and heterogeneity of worker motivation. When intrinsic
motivation is strong (e.g., in the academic and NGO sectors), low-powered incentives may be more
e¢ cient for the principal, and extrinsic incentives may even crowd out intrinsic motivation.6 In addition,
the sorting behavior that can arise from heterogeneous motivations may need to be taken into account
for econometric studies of contract design (Ackerberg and Botticini, 2002).
In this paper we treat the choice of project license as exogenous. Lerner and Tirole (2002) model the
choice of open source license, arguing that the relevant trade-o¤ is between greater proprietary control
with the more commercial, closed licenses and a potentially greater pool of contributors with more open
licenses.7 The sorting e¤ect of the project license plays a central role in their theory, and our results provide
econometric evidence supporting their perspective. We leave for future work the task of incorporating
both the choice of license and the resulting sorting e¤ects into one empirical framework.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets out the theoretical framework and discusses various
developer motivations for open source innovation, which generates the empirical hypotheses we then
investigate. Section 3 describes the data set and the key variables used in the empirical analysis. Section
4 presents the econometric framework for studying sorting behavior of developers. Section 5 presents
descriptive statistics on the main features of sorting by developers. In Section 6 we present the empirical
results on sorting and discuss their implications. Section 7 presents evidence on the impact of contributions
from di¤erent sources on the performance of open source projects. Brief concluding remarks follow.
2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
There are two broad classes of theories about what motivates programmers to contribute to open source
projects: intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. The concept of extrinsic motivation was rst introduced
by Skinner (1953) and further developed by Deci (1971), who dened extrinsically motivated behaviors
5This work has focused primarily on government and non-prot organizations, where it is believed that workers may
be either intrinsically motivated or more strongly motivated agents in the sense that their preferences are aligned with the
employers mission. Leading examples include Frey (1997), Kreps (1997), Francois (2000), Murdock (2002), Bénabou and
Tirole (2003), Besley and Ghatak (2005), Delfgauuw and Dur (2007, 2008), and Prendergast (2008).
6For a empirical examples of crowding out e¤ects, see Frey (1997) and Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997).
7We paraphrase here, using openand closedaccording to our present working denition.
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as those that are seen by actors as means to an end. When thusly motivated, actions are performed
merely in order to attain some separable outcome to which external rewards are attached (such as status,
approval, or monetary compensation). This is what most people in economics and management would
associate with incentives.8 In the absence of a commensurably meaningful reward the action would not
be performed. In contrast, an individual is considered intrinsically motivated to act if she performs an
activity for no apparent reward except the activity itself(Deci, 1972).
Within psychology, the study of intrinsic motivations remains dominated by the work of Deci and
Ryan, who incorporated the concepts of intrinsic motivations into their self-determination theory (SDT).
This theory explores what intrinsic motivation consists of, above and beyond being merely the opposite
of the more intuitive extrinsic motivation. As well, intrinsic motivation is here construed as having its
own type of rewards hard to observe though they may be. Thus, SDT builds on the premise that some
actions in and of themselves can satisfy the three crucial psychological needs of competence, autonomy, and
relatedness, leading to an energizing state that, if satised, conduces toward health and well-being, but,
if not satised, contributes to pathology and ill-being(Ryan and Deci, 2000). The need for competence
leads people to seek challenges that are optimal for their ability level and to attempt to both maintain
and enhance those skills and abilities (Ryan, 1995). The construct of autonomy concerns the degree to
which action and experience are initiated and governed by the self,in accord with self-endorsed values,
needs, and intentions. Relatedness is the need to feel recognized and accepted by those who are viewed
as signicant.
Motivation studies in management typically discuss ways for managers to provide feedback, rewards,
and a sense of belonging to employees in order to boost their internalization of organizational goals.
However, most of these studies do not di¤erentiate between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations, despite
the fact that these concepts underlie many work-motivation theories. A recent review of motivation theory
in the management literature calls for integration of various motivation sub-theories that have developed
in the management eld (Locke and Latham, 2004). As they show, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation
concepts are interwoven into di¤erent theoretical concepts in the growing literature, but they highlight
that empirical work which explicitly tackles extrinsic versus intrinsicmotivation in organizational
setting is still scarce. One exception is Baard, Deci, and Ryan (2004), who nd that if employees possess
a higher sense of autonomy (they feel relatively independent and in charge of their own work), their
intrinsic motivation is higher, which increases their work performance. Similarly, Ilardi, Leone, Kasser,
and Ryan (1993) use self-reported measures of intrinsic motivation to nd that higher intrinsic motivation
increased self-reported measures of job satisfaction in the workplace. However, by and large, there are
almost no systematic econometric analyses that credibly separate and distinguish between intrinsic and
8See Gibbons (1998) for a good review.
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extrinsic motivation, and even fewer that actually assess their relative importance in economic production
and exchange.
The eld of economics has historically not embraced the concept of intrinsic motivation, though in
recent years it has begun to garner some attention. For example, a theoretical paper by Bénabou and
Tirole (2003) provides conditions under which external rewards may undermine intrinsic motivations.
Murdock (2002) models intrinsic motivation as generating some surplus in addition to economic returns
of a trade. He assumes that people care about what they do (intrinsic motivation) in addition to being
paid for it. He also assumes that people derive utility from accomplishing goals, and accomplishing goals
is independent from any nancial reward. Thus intrinsic motivation determines level of e¤ort in the task.
The net returns from a project consist of returns from intrinsic motivation and nancial returns. The net
returns could be still positive even if nancial returns are negative. So, a rm can commit to a project
in cases of negative nancial return provided intrinsic motivation would increase employeesparticipation
e¤ort and thus net return would be positive. The motivating example for this model is Merck, Inc.s
development of a drug that cures river blindness. The nancial returns of the project was negative
ex-ante, but the company decided to complete the project because not going through would have had
negative impact on researchersmorale.9 Kreps (1997) discusses the challenge in trying to understand the
interplay between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, especially when the extrinsic rewards are not sharply
dened. However, his overall assessment is that understanding this interaction is important, though it
may result in messyand partially non-economic considerations involving the form of individualsutility
functions.
The Open Source Software domain is a good setting for this type of research, as it depends on both
intrinsic and extrinsic factors to function. Lakhani and Wolf (2005) operationalize motivation according to
the social psychology constructs of Deci (1971), using survey instruments on a sample of developers listed
in SourceForge.net. They also separated intrinsic motivation into enjoyment-based intrinsic motivation
and obligation/community-based intrinsic motivation (in accord with Lindenberg (2001), who called for
studies on norm-based intrinsic motivation). The survey items to measure intrinsic motivation were
based on self-reported responses to various reasons for why developers contribute, such as whether doing
so would improve their programming skills, whether the contributions were made for results that might be
useful for their own work, and whether they contributed because doing so would enhance their professional
status. They found that intrinsic motivation is in fact the strongest driver of OSS project participation.
Our paper closely relates to Roberts, Hann, and Slaughter (2006), who distinguish motivations as
pure extrinsic (for pay), internalized extrinsic (voluntary but for personal use benet or status), and pure
intrinsic (solely for the joy of doing it). Their empirical setting, like ours, is the OSS community. They
9 In a related vein, Akerlof and Kranton (2003), Bénabou and Tirole (2003), and Francois (2000) also discuss the concept
and implication of nonpecuniary benets.
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also derive their hypotheses from self-determination theory of motivation and then determine relationships
between motivation, participation in OSS projects, and project performance. However, in terms of the
empirical methodology, our study di¤ers substantially from theirs, which relied on 288 responses to an
online survey. Aside from being substantially larger, our sample also eliminates any bias that may result
from the self-reported nature of online surveys.
We identify three types of developers based on the expected relative importance they attach to in-
trinsic motivation when making code contributions: open, closed, and mixed. For this, we assume that
developers reveal themselves as motivated agentswhich is one form of intrinsic motivation if they
are members only of projects that have open licenses, because these projects adhere more closely to the
original philosophy of OSS. Such attachment to projects with open licenses and disinclination to con-
tribute those with more closed licenses  indicates an identication by such developers with the (OSS)
objectives of such projects. This is how Besley and Ghatak (2005) dene motivated agentsalignment
of preferences between the employee and employer.
Conversely, we assume that developers reveal a preference for extrinsic motivation if they belong only
to projects with closed license types. We also argue that anonymous developers are likely to resemble the
intrinsic developer type, because it is doubtful that these developers could benet from external benets
such as reputation or peer recognition. We consider as mixed those developers for which there is no
clear evidence on whether they should care more about intrinsic or extrinsic motivation. Put simply, our
empirical investigation is an e¤ort to document, within a set of OSS developers, systematic patterns of
behavior that are consistent with the predictions of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation theory.
We proceed by identifying four classes of motivations which run the spectrum from highly intrinsic to
highly extrinsic: Pure intrinsic motivation, Utility/Learning, Reciprocity, and Reputation. The literature
and available small-sample survey evidence suggest a role for each of these motivations in open source
development (e.g., Haruvy et al., 2003; Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003; Hertel, Krishnan, and Slaughter,
2003; Lerner and Tirole, 2002). Out of the four motivation types, we can see that reputation relies most
directly on extrinsic mechanisms. This is because the very notion of reputation requires an external
agent to form an opinion of the subject. At the other extreme, pure intrinsic reputation is simply dened
as lacking extrinsic dimensions. Thus, these two are at the tail ends of the motivation spectrum. On the
other hand, reciprocity and utility/learning are likely to lie along the continuum, since both share features
of internal and external motivations. The hypotheses we formulate aim to assess the relative importance of
each motivation type in driving OSS contribution, while acknowledging the important point that an agent
may be driven by more than one motivation type. We proceed by discussing the empirical implication of
each motivation class, and we suggest testable hypotheses.
Pure intrinsic motivation. As discussed earlier, a salient feature of OSS is that many of its developers
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have a strong ideological preference for keeping their source code fully open. In economic terms, this
means that for a developer who is a¢ liated only with open projects, the utility derived from making a
code contribution is larger if it is made to a project that is itself open. In the extreme, this utility would
be zero if the contribution were made to a project with any other license type. In psychological terms,
purely motivated developers should achieve greater levels of autonomy through acting in accord with
self-endorsed values, needs, and intentions, as well as a stronger sense of ideological relatedness to the
relevant OSS community. This leads to our rst hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a (intrinsic motivation, open/anonymous developers): Open (closed) projects should
receive more (fewer) contributions from anonymous and open developers.
This aspect of the intrinsic motivation hypothesis predicts positive (but not necessarily exclusive)
sorting of open developers to open-license projects. That is, more intrinsically motivated developers
(those more likely to be anonymous or open developers who are members of projects with highly open
licenses) would be more likely to contribute to projects with highly open licenses because these more
closely match the OSS philosophy.
The debate between advocates of open source and proprietary software has been polarized, with
strident criticism from both sides of the divide (for discussion, see Lerner and Schankerman, 2010). In
this context, there may also be developers ideologically motivated against contributing to HO projects,
whose licenses may be viewed as anti-property rights. 10 To the extent this view is widely held, the
ideological motivation may also induce sorting by closed developers. It is important to emphasize that
this type of sorting should be considered a form of intrinsic motivation, because it is ideologically based.
Hypothesis 1b (intrinsic motivation, closed developers): Closed (open) projects should receive more
(fewer) contributions from closed developers.
Reputation. The reputation-related motivations in OSS communities have been well documented (e.g.,
Hertel et al., 2003; Markus et al., 2000). Here, the benets are much more starkly extrinsic, since it is
clear to see how status and respect from the other members of a community may motivate contributors to
expend e¤ort even in the absence of pecuniary rewards. However, their relative importance in comparison
to other types of motivation is subject to debate. Lerner and Tirole (2002) argue that developers improve
their labor market prospects by signaling their quality through participation in open source projects.
These signaling benets are likely to be greater: (1) when the project to which they contribute is larger and
more visible (Johnson, 2002), (2) when the project reveals the outcome of the contribution; for example,
by being accepted by the project manager, (3) when the project is sponsored by commercial rms, and
10The highly open GPL license is also known by some open source advocates as copyleftto emphasize this anti-property
rights perspective.
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(4) when the project is aimed at developer-users rather than end users. The prediction of the commercial
reputation (labor market signaling) hypothesis is that closed developers should sort positively on these
four dimensions. Importantly, because reputational benets clearly should not matter to anonymous
contributors, this group can serve as a benchmark against which reputation e¤ects are evaluated.
The second type of reputation gain is basic peer recognition, which is unrelated to labor market payo¤s.
Peer recognition should also be greater for larger projects, projects that reveal patch outcomes, and those
aimed at programming tools rather than end users. Whether peer recognition should be regarded as
intrinsic or extrinsic motivation is less clear. On the one hand, peer recognition is likely to depend on the
quality of a developers contribution and to thus also lead to more externalized rewards such as status or
monetary compensation. On the other, peer recognition by itself is consistent with the relatedness element
of the SDC theory the need to feel recognized by those who are viewed as signicant. Nonetheless, it is
important to note that whether reputation works via the labor market or peer recognition, it should play
no role for anonymous contributors, since they cannot benet from it. Moreover, among non-anonymous
developers, we expect that reputation would be less important for contributors who sort (primarily)
into open projects. This is because intrinsic motivation (in the form of motivated agents) plays a more
important role for them. In contrast, extrinsically motivated (closed) developers should be more attracted
to more visible projects, where their gains from reputation are likely to be greater.
This discussion leads to the following set of hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a (reputation, project size): All developer types, except anonymous, should be more likely
to contribute to larger projects.
Hypothesis 2b (reputation, visible contribution outcome): All developer types, except anonymous,
should be more likely to contribute to projects that reveal the outcome of the contribution. Anonymous
developers should either be una¤ected by this, or be negatively a¤ected, if this crowds out their intrinsic
(ideology) motivation.
As proposed by Lerner and Tirole (2002), commercial sponsorship of a project can increase e¤ectiveness
of labor market signaling by developers, which should make such projects more attractive to extrinsically
motivated developers. Thus:
Hypothesis 2c (reputation, corporate sponsorship): Closed developers should be more likely to con-
tribute to projects that are sponsored by corporations. However, anonymous and open developers should
either be una¤ected by this, or be negatively a¤ected, if this crowds out their intrinsic (ideology) motiva-
tion.
Finally, the reputation gains are likely to be greater when the developers peer group is more able to
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understand the technical merit of her contributions, both for reputation in the labor market and peer
recognition. Therefore, to the extent that reputation is valuable to extrinsically motivated developers, we
expect these gains to be larger when the intended audience for the receiving project is developers rather
than end users. This leads to:
Hypothesis 2d (reputation, intended audience): Both open and closed developers should be more likely
to contribute to projects that are intended to be used by developers (as opposed to end users). Anonymous
developers should not systematically sort on this dimension.
Reciprocity. The earliest proponents of open source emphasized the role that reciprocity (sometimes
also known as gift culture) plays in sustaining incentives for innovation. The hypothesis is that devel-
opers who are members of a project may make contributions either in direct response to, or anticipation
of, contributions made by other developers to their project. Evidence from surveys of programmers cer-
tainly points to its importance. The idea that reciprocity can be sustained as an equilibrium over time
is also well grounded in the economic theory of repeated games, though whether its assumptions t the
open source context is open to dispute. This equilibrium can be rationalized by the theory of repeated,
non-cooperative games if players (code contributors) can detect and e¤ectively punish those who deviate
from reciprocity strategies. However, within the open source context, it is di¢ cult in practice to identify
such deviation (i.e., how can one know what level of contributions reveals such deviation) and to punish it.
It may also be easier to sustain such reciprocity in particular kinds of projects, where the set of potential
contributors is more readily known and thus non-reciprocal behavior is more easily spotted.
This construct may impact both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. If the OSS developer feels that
doing work now may result in future benets through othersreciprocity, then this will elicit an extrinsic
motivation. On the other hand, if the developer feels compelled to contribute in order to give back,
then reciprocity may elicit an intrinsic motivation. Empirically, there is some evidence that both e¤ects
will be relevant. For example, Shah (2006) nds that one of the most important reasons for developers to
contribute to open platforms was a sense of reciprocity. Apart from deriving satisfaction from developing
a code, contributors felt that helping others in the community was important because they had beneted
from otherscontributions.
The psychological contract theory also suggests that some contracts may involve strong emotional ties
and loyalties, which necessitate reciprocal appreciation of intrinsic motivation (Rousseau and McLean
Parks, 1993; Schein, 1965). This goes beyond simple transactions and involves socio-emotional implicit
agreements or perceptions of agreements. From this perspective, the reciprocity encountered in organi-
zations may have both intrinsic and extrinsic components. More relatedly, current work exploring the
motivations behind OSS has pointed to reciprocity as a plausible mechanism. Lakhani and von Hippel
(2003) nd that reciprocity is the most important reason contributors cite for posting answers on Usenet
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groups. These people either repay for the benets they had received or contribute in expectation of ben-
etting from the community in the future. But it is important to note that we are agnostic as to whether
reciprocity works through extrinsic or intrinsic channels (or both). This leads to:
Hypothesis 3 (reciprocity): Contributions from members of project i to project j in year t should be
more likely when members of project j have contributed to project i at some point prior to year t:
Utility/learning: Like reciprocity, utility and learning motivations can consist of intrinsic and extrinsic
components. Developers may contribute code to projects because they enjoy doing so (intrinsic) or because
they learn from the process, which can provide benets later (extrinsic). In addition, they may hope to
inuence the direction of the software project in ways from which they expect to benet later. Such
learning and inuencing benets from making contributions are likely to be stronger if the contributing
and receiving projects use the same programming language or operating system.11 Thus:
Hypothesis 4 (utility/learning): Projects are likely to receive more contributions from developers who
are a¢ liated with other projects that have the same programming language or operating system.
3. Data
The data are taken from SourceForge, the largest web host for open source software projects. SourceForge
provides a publicly accessible platform, introduced in 1999, where developers interact during the software
development process. We developed specialized software algorithms that accessed each project registered
on SourceForge over the period 19992010, and extracted all available information about the project, the
participating developers, and their software code contributions. The nal data set covers the 211,705
open source projects registered on SourceForge over this period, and all code contributions made to these
projects. While our raw sample includes information on all 211,705 projects registered on SourceForge.net
as of November 2010, the distribution of code contributions by receiving projects is highly concentrated,
with only 6,316 (3 percent) receiving any external contributions over the ten years covered by the data.
Interestingly, including internal contributions only raises that gure to 3.4 percent. The majority of
the analysis focuses on the smaller sample of active projects. The Data Appendix provides a detailed
description of the data collection, as well as a number of consistency checks.
We begin by dening some key terms. A contribution is dened as any contributed code that aims
to advance the software in a particular manner (whether or not it is accepted by the project manager).
There is no limit (minimum or maximum) on the number of lines of code it involves. This denition is
11The similarity in language may also be a driver because developers incur e¤ort costs in making code contributions, and
they may be more likely to contribute when these costs are lower. This could be the case when the programming languages
of contributing and receiving project are similar. We acknowledge that it is not possible to distinguish empirically between
the role of lower e¤ort costs and utility/learning benets.
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maintained throughout the sample period. Our denition is standard in the empirical literature on code
contributions using SourceForge data. We exclude software bug reports and xes, which are more minor
interventions.
The contributing project is the project with which the developer making the patch contribution is
a¢ liated as a registered member. If the developer belongs to more than one project, we treat each sep-
arate project as a contributing project. We treat contributions made by anonymous developers, and by
developers are not registered as members of any projects, as separate categories. We dene the receiving
project as the one to which the patch contribution is submitted. The distinction between the contributing
and receiving projects is central to our empirical analysis of sorting, because our objective is to establish
whether developers a¢ liated with certain types of projects (in terms of their license type) systematically
target certain kinds of projects. Finally, we dene external contributions as patches submitted by de-
velopers who are not registered members of the receiving project, and internal contributions as patches
submitted by developers to projects of which they are members.
The key variables in the empirical analysis are as follows:
Project License Type: The most important project characteristic we consider in this paper is license
type. Each project is governed by a set of rules that dene the terms of use of the software developed by
its members and other participants. These terms of use are dened by the project license, which focuses
mainly on the extent to which commercial use is allowed. Licenses that constrain such use more severely
are referred to in the literature on open source as more restrictive.We label the projects governed by
these licenses as open,because the impact of these restrictive licenses is to keep software free, in the
spirit of Open Software. Two main features dene the restrictiveness of a license: (1) the extent to
which the code and any of its modications can be subsequently embodied in commercial software and
(2) whether modications to the code have to remain open source (i.e., the binary code must remain open
and accessible).12 The projects in our data cover about 44 license types. Using the description of each
license type (http://www.opensource.org/licenses), we classify licenses into three categories:
1. Highly Open (HO): This type includes the GPL (General Purpose License) license. It requires
that any le, regardless of code origin, which is combined under certain circumstances with a le
under GPL must be licensed under GPL. This license type is regarded as ideologically closest to
the original idea behind the free softwaremovement, and its objective is to preserve a fully open
software commons and limit commercial gains from software development to the maximum possible
extent.
2. Open (O): The license requires that modied versions of the program can only be distributed if the
source code remains open source, but it can be used commercially. There are no restrictions on the
12For a good discussion of di¤erent license types and their restrictions, see Lerner and Tirole (2002).
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license conditions of the modications and extensions of the code, provided that they remain open
source. Examples include Lesser GPL, Common Public License, and Sun Public License.
3. Closed (C): The license allows modications and extensions of the open source code to be integrated
into commercial software, and these do not have to remain open source. Examples include BSD,
Python, and MIT.
Projects may have more than one license type. In cases of multiple licenses (7 percent of the sample
projects), we classify the project as HO if at least one of its licenses is highly open, and as C if all of
its licenses are closed.13 The remaining projects are classied as O. In the complete sample, 47 percent
operate under an HO license and 43 percent under a C license.14 Among projects that receive at least one
code contribution, 60 percent operate under HO licenses, and 25 percent under C licenses. This di¤erence
reects that fact that highly open projects receive fewer contributions per project than those under closed
licenses.
As mentioned earlier, a project can receive contributions from its members (internal contributions) or
developers who have no formal a¢ liation with the focal project (external contributions). In the sample,
39 percent of contributions are internal. The remaining 61 percent are external, coming either from
developers who are formally a¢ liated with other projects (but not the focal project), are not members of
any project, or do not reveal their identity when making their contribution (anonymous developers). In
what follows, we focus the analysis of sorting behavior on the pattern of these external contributions. In
the empirical section we study the impact of di¤erent types of contributions, both internal and external,
on the performance of the receiving projects.
Developer Types: We assign each developer a type based on the types of projects to which she
belongs as a registered member. We classify a developer as open if all of the projects to which she belongs
operate under highly open license, as dened above. We dene a developer as closed if all of the projects
to which she belongs operate under closed licenses. All other developers who are members of projects are
classied as mixed. The majority of developers belong to very few projects the mean number of projects
of which a developer is a member is 1.4 (median is 1, 99th percentile is 7). In addition, we use two other
categories: Anonymousdevelopers are those who submit contributions without revealing their identity
to the receiving project manager or members. Non-membersare contributors who are not registered as
members of any project.
Of the 149,956 developers registered on SourceForge (i.e., having a unique user name), 68 percent
have no a¢ liation to any project, 15 percent are open developers, 9 percent are closed developers, and
13The results reported in the paper are robust to alternative assumptions, such as classifying projects as highly open only
if all of their licenses are highly open, or classifying projects as closed only if the majority of their licenses are closed.
14 In their study of the determinants of project license type, Lerner and Tirole (2002) use an earlier and smaller sample
but nd a very similar distribution of license types.
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the remaining are classied as mixed. Of the total sample of developers, only 22,512 (15 percent) make
at least one contribution to projects with which they are not a¢ liated (external contributions ) over
the ten-year sample period.
Size of Project: The size of the project is dened by the number of developers registered as formal
members, including the project manager.15 Size is a central measure in our analysis because it is our key
test of Hypothesis 2a on the reputation motive.
Most projects are small  the median project has one member (mean is 4.1). The distribution is
sharply skewed, however the project at the 90th percentile of the size distribution has 10 members (99th
percentile is 37 members). Larger projects receive more (external) contributions than small projects.
Conditional on receiving at least one external contribution, projects above the median size receive an
average of 28.5 contributions, compared to only 8.8 for below median-size projects.
Resolution of the code contribution: From information on SourceForge, we know whether the open
source project reveals to outsiders whether an individual code contribution has been accepted (i.e., in-
corporated in the project software). In total, 46 percent of projects registered on SourceForge reveal the
outcome of (at least some) contributions.
Intended Audience: SourceForge identies the intended audience for each registered software project
from among 19 groups. We aggregate these groups into ve categories for the empirical analysis: De-
velopers (programming tools), End Users, System Administrators, Mixed (of the preceding three), and
Other.16 About 30 percent of projects receiving contributions are developer-oriented and 18 percent tar-
get end users. We also include a separate category for projects that do not specify intended audience (16
percent of projects).
Programming Language: Projects fall under one of 70 di¤erent programming languages. Based on
discussions with software developers, we group these languages into ve broad categories: object-oriented,
imperative, scriptive, dynamic, and other (Data Appendix for details). We also include a separate category
for projects that do not specify their programming languages (14 percent of projects).
Operating System: Each project is conducted on one or more operating system, which is the platform
on which the program runs. We use four groups of operating systems: Microsoft, Open Source Indepen-
dent, POSIX, and Mixed (Data Appendix for details). We also include a separate category for projects
that do not specify their operating system platform (20 percent of projects).
15An alternative measure of size is the total number of patches received by the project. However, because we want to
explain the pattern of developer code contributions, it would be problematic to treat this measure as exogenous for small
projects since the developers decision to contribute would a¤ect the measure of project size.
16The End User category includes end users/desktop and advanced end users. The Other category, which account for
about four percent of projects, includes mainly aerospace, education, science/research and healthcare.
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4. Econometric Specication
Our primary objective is to estimate the e¤ect of project characteristics on the pattern of code contribu-
tions. To do this, we rst aggregate patches into cells, where each cell is dened by a set of characteristics of
the contributing and receiving projects. These cells become the observations in the estimation procedure.
The empirical task is to relate the number of contributions between di¤erent cells to the characteristics
of the contributing and receiving projects dening those cells.
Since the number of contributions is an integer, we use an econometric model for count data. We
adopt a Negative Binomial specication
Yc;r = exp(Xc + Xr + XcXr + cr) ((1))
where Yc;r denotes the number of contributions from projects in cell c to projects in cell r; Xc is a vector of
characteristics of the contributing project c (including the developer type), Xr is a vector of characteristics
of the receiving project r; and we assume that the negative binomial error is conditionally independent of
the characteristics in (Xc; Xr), E(cr j Xc; Xr) = 0: The model is estimated by maximum likelihood.17
Our primary interest is in the interaction coe¢ cients between the developer type and the receiving
project characteristics, the 0s: These coe¢ cients describe how developers endogenously sort (i.e. target
their contributions) on the license type and other receiving project characteristics. We refer to these
interaction coe¢ cients as the sorting parameters.
We use the following dimensions to dene cells. For the contributing project, we focus on the developer
type. As explained earlier, we infer the developer type from the project a¢ liations (membership) of
the developer. Using the contributing developer type allows us to examine whether developers sort 
i.e., target  projects with specic types of open source licenses. For the receiving project, we use
ve characteristics: license type, intended audience, programming language, operating system, and age.
Project age is important because we measure the number of contributions made over the entire life of the
project on SourceForge, and this will depend on how long the project has been registered. Each of these
dimensions of the contributing and receiving projects are dened as dummy variables. An example of a cell
is the total number of contributions (over the sample period 20012010) made by highly open developers
to projects with a closed license and a particular intended audience, operating system, programming
language, and project age. The total number of cells in the regression equals the product of the number
of developer types, intended audiences, operating systems, programming languages, and project ages for
which information on contributions is available.18
17The alternative, Poisson model imposes the strong restriction that the conditional mean and variance of Ycr are equal.
The Negative Binomial model allows for overdispersion of the form V ar(Yc;r) = E(Yc;r) + [E(Yc;r)]2 and estimates the
overdispersion parameter  along with the other parameters. Our estimates easily reject the Poisson case  = 0:
18Some cells have only dormant projects which receive no contributions at all over the sample period, in which case we
drop them in the estimation procedure.
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The key point to recognize here is that the dependent variable, Yc;r; is dened on the basis of a set
of contributing and receiving project characteristics at the cell level, not at the level of the individual
contribution. These cells are dened in terms of the set of developer type (the contributing project charac-
teristic we focus on) and the receiving project characteristics described above. Thus there is no ambiguity
about the contributing developer type in the sorting, even though we analyze ows of contributions at
the cell level.
As explanatory variables in the regressions, we include a complete set of dummy variables for the
contributing developer type and the receiving project characteristics, and their interactions. In addition,
we include the average size (number of registered members) of the receiving projects in each cell, interacted
with the developer type, to allow for sorting by developers on project size. We also control for the number
of potentially receiving projects in the same cell since that will a¤ect the ow of contributions.19 We
include projects that do not receive any contributions over the sample period provided that they are in
a cell where at least project received one or more contributions. We drop cells if all projects in the cell
received no contributions over the entire sample period.
We must normalize one of the coe¢ cients on the interaction dummy variables between developer and
license type (since we also control for additive e¤ects in these dimensions). The choice of normalization
only a¤ects the interpretation, not the estimation, of parameters. We set the coe¢ cient on the open
developer HO license interaction equal to zero, so all estimated interaction coe¢ cients measure impacts
relative to this reference group, i.e., relative to the expected number of contributions by open developers
to projects with HO licenses.
The identication assumption we use is that the license type, and other project characteristics, are
exogenous with respect to the individual developers decision to contribute. The main source of concern
is unobserved project quality, which might be correlated both with the observed characteristics of, and
the number of contributions made to, a project. Our empirical strategy should be more robust to this
problem, however, because our primary focus is on the interactions between the contributing developer
type and project characteristics, the  coe¢ cients not on the level e¤ects given by (; ). Unobserved
heterogeneity will induce bias only if it is correlated with these interactions. While higher-quality projects
may attract more contributions, it is not clear why this should systematically a¤ect one type of contributor
more than the other.
There is also a concern that our measure of project size  the number of registered members 
might be endogenous if unobserved project quality both attracts more members and makes it more likely
that developers will contribute patches to the project. While we control for many observed project
19We do not control for the number of potentially contributing developers because there is no way to do this for one
important category, Anonymous developers. This means that it is di¢ cult to interpret di¤erences in the levels of sorting
coe¢ cients across developer types. Our main focus will be the sorting behavior of each developer type separately.
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characteristics that might be correlated with project quality, we cannot rule out the possibility of an
unobserved element to quality. If this is present, we expect the coe¢ cient on project size to be biased
upward. However, and this is the key point for our analysis, there is no obvious reason to expect this
upward bias to be di¤erent for di¤erent types of developers. As we will show, we nd that project size
matters much more for closed developers where the theory suggests that labor market signaling should
be more important. Thus, while we cannot rule out the possibility that our estimated marginal e¤ect of
project size on contributions may be upward biased, we believe our key inference is robust to this concern.
Finally, one might be concerned that project size itself depends on the project managers initial choice
of open source license and other project characteristics. What would be the consequences for our ndings if
this is so? Suppose that the project license type (or other characteristics) a¤ects not only contributions but
also membership. In the econometric work on sorting, we exclude internal contributions. It is reasonable
to assume that developers who become members of a project are those most interested in the project,
and thus most likely to contribute heavily to the project if they did not become members. This implies
that we would underestimate the impact of sorting on the actual ow contributions the project receives,
since we do not capture the internal contributions made by developers who are induced to register as
members by the managers initial choice of project characteristics. In this sense, our empirical conclusion
that there is strong sorting by developers is conservative.
5. Descriptive Statistics
Developers in our sample make 103,712 external code contributions. Table 1 shows how these contributions
distribute across developer types. Of the total, 31 percent come from non-members, 18 percent from
anonymous contributors, 14 percent from open developers, and 13 percent from closed developers. The
remaining contributions are from mixed developers. Mixed developers are the most active contributors,
with an average of 11.2 contributions per developer. The least active developers are non-members, with
only 2.1 contributions per developer. However, while they contribute fewer code contributions, in Section
7 we show that the contributions by non-members have a much larger impact on project performance
than the other categories of external contributors.
Open developers tend to be members of fewer projects than closed and mixed developers (means of
1.5, 2.0, and 2.9 projects, and 99th percentile values of 5, 11, and 12, respectively). However, there is no
substantial di¤erence in the number of distinct projects to which developers of di¤erent types contribute
(not reported in the Table 1): mean values are 1.4, 1.5, and 1.5, respectively. Non-member developers
tend to focus their contributions more narrowly (an average of only 1.1. projects) than developers who
belong to projects.
Table 2 summarizes key aspects of sorting behavior by developers: how they target their contributions
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toward di¤erent types of projects. Several interesting patterns emerge. First, there is strong sorting of
contributions on project license type. Both anonymous and open developers are much more likely to
contribute to projects operating under highly open licenses. For anonymous developers, more than 80
percent of their contributions go to such projects, with a further 10 percent or more directed to moderately
open projects. Open developers follow a similar pattern: two thirds of their contributions go to highly
open projects, with an additional 17 percent that go to moderately open projects. In sharp contrast,
closed developers focus more heavily on projects with closed licenses 36 percent going to such projects
(as compared 9 and 16 percent for anonymous and open developers).
Second, there is strong sorting on the intended audience of the project. Closed developers are 3.5
times more likely to contribute to projects aimed at developing programming tools than to projects
whose main audience is end users. In sharp contrast, anonymous developers are almost four times more
likely to contribute to projects aimed at end users compared to projects targeting other developers. Open
developers do not seem to favor either end-user or developer projects. While there does not appear to be
any clear sorting by open developers in this table, once we control for other factors in the econometric
analysis (Section 6) we nd that there is also strong sorting toward end-user projects by open developers
as well. This pattern of sorting on intended audience of the software project is interesting because, given
the importance of cumulative innovation in software, programming tools are likely to contribute more to
the long-run technological advance in this sector than end-user products.
Third, closed developers sort much more strongly on the size of the project as compared to anonymous
or open developers. For example, 43.9 percent of contributions by closed developers go to projects with
more than 10 members, whereas the corresponding gures are 30.7 percent for open developers and only
17.7 percent for anonymous contributors.
These two ndings sorting by intended audience and project size are consistent with the hypothesis
that closed developers are more driven by the motive to build a reputation and signal it in labor markets,
since programming skills are more e¤ectively signaled via contributions to developer tools (where the
audience has the technical skills to evaluate them), and to more visible projects. In the econometric
analysis, we will also provide further evidence that supports the importance of the reputation motive,
while we also consider and try to rule out other explanations for this observed sorting behavior.
6. Econometric Results
6.1. Baseline Specication
Table 3 presents the estimated parameters (marginal e¤ects) for the baseline model. We focus on the
sorting coe¢ cients that describe matching between the contributing developer type and the license and
size of the receiving project. The regression also includes a complete set of additive dummy variables
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for the receiving project characteristics (parameters omitted for brevity). Each sorting coe¢ cient gives
the impact of a unit change in the control variable on the expected number of contributions, all dened
relative to the number of contributions contributed by the open developer to a project with an HO license
(this is the reference category). Sorting behavior by a developer type is revealed by comparing the sorting
coe¢ cients for that developer type across projects with di¤erent licenses.20 21
The empirical results show that there is strong sorting behavior by developers. Turning rst to column
2, we see that open developers are much more likely to contribute to projects that have highly open licenses
than to those with less open licenses. Changing the project license from highly open to open reduces the
number of contributions by open developers by 1.62. Since the average number of contributions by open
developers at the cell level is 9.3, this is equivalent to a 17.4 percent reduction. Moving from an open to
a closed license is associated with an additional reduction in contributions of 0.34, or 3.7 percent. The
2 test strongly rejects the hypothesis that there is no sorting by license type for highly open developers
(p-value< .001).
Contributions by anonymous developers cannot be driven by career concerns because they do not
reveal their identity and cannot gain from peer recognition or labor market signaling. Thus anonymous
contribution activity indicates either the importance of ideology as motivation (motivated agents) or
pure utility/learning value from contributing. If they are primarily intrinsically motivated agents, we
expect them to sort on highly open projects, whereas the utility value/learning incentive predicts no
systematic sorting on license type. Column 1 in Table 4 shows that anonymous developers sort in a
way similar to highly open developers. The sorting coe¢ cient on HO licenses is not statistically di¤erent
from zero, which is the same as for open developers. Moreover, anonymous developers show the same
disinclination to contribute to projects with less open or closed licenses. This is shown by the statistically
signicant, negative sorting on open and closed licenses (-2.20 and -2.95, respectively). These results for
highly open and anonymous developers provide support for the pure intrinsic motivationhypothesis,
indicating that these types of developers attach value to the open source ideology that favors highly
restrictive (open) licenses. This evidence strongly supports Hypothesis 1a.
We nd the opposite pattern of sorting by closed developers (column 4). They are much more likely
to contribute to projects with less open or closed licenses. For example, comparing the sorting coe¢ cients
for the C and HO licenses (-1.40 and -2.93, respectively), we see that moving from an C to an HO license
reduces the number of contributions by closed developers by 1.53. This represents an 18.7 percent fall
20Di¤erences in the sorting coe¢ cients across developer types, for a given license, reect di¤erences in both the numbers
of potentially contributing developers of each type and their intensity of contributions.
21Table 3 includes the mean number of contributions by di¤erent developer types at the cell level, which we use to
compute percentage impacts in the discussion which follows. For completeness, we provide here more information on these
di¤erences. The mean, median and 99th percentile of the distribution of contributions at the cell level are as follows:
Anonymous developers 12.1, 1, and 114; Open developers 9.3, 1, and 142; Mixed developers 16.7, 9, and 180; Closed
developers 8.2, 0, and 145; and Non-members 21.0, 3, and 326.
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in their contributions at the cell level (= 1.53/8.2). Again, we decisively reject the null hypothesis that
there is no sorting by closed developers (p-value <.001). This evidence is consistent with Hypothesis 1b.
Interestingly, we do not nd any sorting behavior for mixed developers (column 3), who are registered
members of (multiple) projects with di¤erent types of licenses. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that
there is no sorting for these developers (p-value = .51). This indicates an indi¤erence to the choice of
project license type, both in their choices on membership and in their contribution activity.
Finally, the results in column 5 show that non-member developers exhibit behavior which is very
similar to open and anonymous developers. In particular, non-member contributors sort toward highly
open licenses. Moving from an HO to a C license reduces the number of contributions by non-member
by 2.43 (= 2.65-5.08). Their average number of contributions at the cell level is 21.0, so this change in
license type reduces their contributions by 11.6 percent.
We turn next to the impact of project size on the inow of contributions. Project size plays two roles.
First, the number of members who belong to a project may be a proxy for unobserved project quality.
If this is so, larger projects would attract more contributions from all developer types. Second, project
size may be associated with more exposure and thus larger reputation gains.22 But these gains can come
both in the form of greater peer recognition and/or labor market signaling benets. Thus they can be
enjoyed both by open developers and more commercially oriented, closed developers. Hence there is no
theoretical prediction as to whether open or closed developers should value project size more strongly.
This is an empirical question.
Nonetheless, we can distinguish between the project quality and reputation e¤ects associated with
project size in the following way. Reputation benets should not be relevant to developers who contribute
anonymously. In deciding where to contribute, however, anonymous developers are likely to prefer higher
quality projects (e.g., if they get greater utility value from such projects). Therefore, we can infer the im-
pact of project quality on contributions from the behavior of the anonymous type. Under the assumption
that other developer types have similar preferences for contributing to high-quality projects, we can iden-
tify the reputation e¤ect associated with project size by taking the coe¢ cient on size for each developer
type minus the corresponding coe¢ cient for anonymous developers.
Turning to the result, we nd a statistically signicant e¤ect of project size for anonymous developers,
but the impact is not large. The point estimate of 2.66 implies that a ten percent increase in project size
raises contributions by 0.266, which is only 2.2 percent of the average number of contributions at the cell
level by these developers. The fact that size matters at all for them, however, is interesting because it
indicates that the utility gains from contributing are related to project size (or project quality for which
22Larger projects may be more visible, but an individuals contribution in a large project may be less salient. Thus it is
not clear whether larger projects generate greater indivisual reputation gains. We are grateful to the Associate Editor for
pointing this out. However, as we discuss in the text, the parameter estimates indicate that such gains are increasing in
project size (controlling for pure utility value of contributing to larger projects).
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it may serve as a proxy).
Subtracting the point estimate for the anonymous developers from the size coe¢ cients for the other
developer types, we get the following estimates for how reputation gains are related to receiving project
size: 0.03 for open developers, 0.31 for mixed, 0.91 for closed, and 0.56 for non-members. These coe¢ cients
indicate that reputation gains for open developers do not appear to be related to project size, as we
measure it, but they are related for the other developer types, especially the more commercially oriented,
closed developers.23 This nding strongly supports Hypotheses 2a on reputation and project size.
Finally, the test statistics in Table 4 conrm that intended audience, programming language, and op-
erating system all signicantly a¤ect the pattern of contributions. We decisively reject the null hypothesis
that each of these (sets of) dummy variables do not a¤ect contributions (p-value < .001 for each of the
three cases).
To summarize, our key empirical nding is that project characteristics, including license type, a¤ect
the level of contributions by each developer type. This means that the choices managers of open source
projects make in this regard are important. We illustrate this point in more detail in Section 6.5.
To test our Hypothesis 2d, on reputation and intended audience, Table 4 explores sorting patterns
on intended audience.24 We add interaction terms for each developer type with their intended audience
dummies: developer tools and end users. The pattern of results shows that there is strong sorting on
intended audience both by open and closed developers. Starting with open developers, shown in column
2, moving from developer tools to end-user projects is associated with an increase in the number of
contributions of 2.12 (= 0.65+1.47). This change in intended audience type reduces their contributions
by 22.8 percent (relative to the cell average number of contributions). Anonymous developers show
a similar pattern. Moving from developers tools to end users raises their number of contributions by
1.25 (= -1.56+2.81), or 10.3 percent of average cell number of contributions. In sharp contrast, closed
developers seem to express a strong preference for developer tools projects. Moving from end users to
developer tools increases the number of contributions made by closed developers by 1.91 (= 2.05-0.14),
accounting for 23.3 percent of contributions by this developer type. Interestingly, non-member developers
continue to be similar to open developers in terms of intended audience sorting, while the sorting pattern
for mixed developers is similar to that of closed developers.
These ndings provide only partial support for Hypothesis 2d. We nd the predicted sorting by closed
developers toward developer tool projects, where labor market signaling benets are likely to be larger.
However, we also nd sorting by open and anonymous developers toward end-user projects, whereas our
23We also estimated the baseline specication in Table 3 separately for di¤erent receiving project sizes. The results show
the same pattern of sorting between developer type and receiving project license, for di¤erent size categories.
24 It is important to note that license type is highly correlated with intended audience. This makes identifying sorting by
license type and intended audience more di¢ cult. In our sample, 87 percent of end-user projects have a highly open license,
as compared to only 31 for developer projects.
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prediction was that open developers would favor developer tools and anonymous would not sort on this
dimension.
6.2. Robustness Analysis
Matching on programming skills and software architecture
One concern is that the observed sorting behavior might be due, at least in part, to similarity in
programming language or software architecture, which developers seek to exploit, but which might be
correlated with project license type. If developers are matching their skills to the programming language
or software architecture (e.g., operating system), we might be confounding the mechanism that induces
sorting. To address this concern, we perform the following test. We exclude anonymous and non-member
developers, focusing only on member developers, and dene cells on the basis of the programming language.
We dene a new dummy variable that receives the value of one for cells where the programming languages
of the contributing and receiving projects are the same and re-estimate the baseline specication with
this additional control variable. In cases where a contributing developer belongs to multiple projects, the
contribution is counted separately for each project, so the matching dummies are dened at level of the
contributing-receiving projects pair.
The sorting results continue to hold in this extended specication which controls for programming
language match. As expected, the e¤ect of programming language match is large and highly signicant,
with a marginal e¤ect of 0.45 (standard error of 0.042), relative to a cell average number of contributions
of 1.8. Moving from a HO to a C license reduces contributions by open developers by 12 percent, and
increases it by 9 percent for closed developers. These estimates are very close to those where we exclude
the programming language match dummy (13 and 12 percent).
We also repeat the above analysis matching on the operating systems of the contributing and receiving
projects. Matching on operating systems, as expected, strongly a¤ects contributions (a marginal e¤ect
of 0.47 with standard error of 0.09, as compared to the mean cell contribution of 2.21). The licensing
sorting e¤ects remain robust. Moving from a HO to a C license reduces open developer contributions by
16 percent, and raises closed developer contributions by 16 percent.
Project quality
There is no reason to expect that unobserved project quality is systematically correlated with the
interaction between project license and developer type. Nonetheless, we perform an additional test to
check robustness by introducing two direct measures of project quality. The rst is the cumulative number
of downloads of the project on SourceForge prior to the year of contribution. The second measure is the
lag between the contributing year and project registration year. The idea behind this second measure is
that higher-quality projects are more likely to attract contributions for a longer period of time (rather
than just a burst when the project is launched). In the baseline analysis, we did not use information on
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the year of contributions in the denition of cells. However, in order to conduct these additional tests we
need to redene cells more nely, including the year of contribution as an additional dimension.
The main results on sorting continue to hold when we introduce these controls for project quality
(results are omitted for brevity). We nd that past cumulative downloads are positively, and signicantly,
related to the number of contributions received by a project in a given year which is consistent with
downloads being an indicator of project quality but we do not nd any statistically signicant e¤ect for
the contributions lag. Importantly, the pattern and magnitude of sorting are robust to these new controls.
For example, the estimates imply that moving from an HO to C license reduces average contributions by
anonymous and open developers by 32 and 24 percent, and raises contributions by closed developers by 27
percent. These impacts are actually somewhat larger than the baseline e¤ects, conrming that di¤erences
in project quality (at least as we measure it) are not driving the sorting results.
Variation over time and removing outliers. We perform two nal robustness checks of our sorting
e¤ects. First, the role of intrinsic motivation may be changing over time. Corporate involvement in the
open source community has been increasing, which may be a reection of a less sharp ideological divide
between the open source and proprietary software communities. Therefore, we check the sensitivity of the
sorting e¤ects to temporal shifts. We estimate the baseline model separately for the periods 19992005
and 20062010, based on project registration year (the same pattern of results holds when we split the
sample by contribution year instead). We nd that sorting on license type holds for both periods, but
sorting is actually substantially stronger in the 20062010 period. For the pre-2006 period, moving from
an HO to C license reduces contributions by 12 and 24 percent for anonymous and open developers, and
raises contributions by 23 percent for closed developers. For the post-2005 period, moving from an HO
to C license reduces contributions by 28 and 30 percent for anonymous and open developers, and raises
contributions by 41 percent for closed developers.
Second, the distribution of contributions is highly skewed a small number of projects receive a large
fraction of contributions, and a small number of developers make a signicant share of contributions.
Because there may be unobserved heterogeneity in these groups, we check the robustness of the results
to removing outlier projects and developers. We drop projects that receive a very large number of
contributions and developers who make a very high number of contributions (in each case, we winsorize
at the 99th percentile). In both cases, the same pattern of sorting continues to hold.
6.3. Extensions
In this section we discuss two additional experiments to rene our inferences about the role of reputation.
Public resolution of contributions
The rst extension exploits information on whether the receiving project announces whether the
contribution made by a developer is accepted or rejected. After a developer makes a contribution, the
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project manager (or members) decides whether or not to accept it and to make the decision public on
SourceForge. The decision is made for each contribution separately, but projects di¤er in the degree to
which they make these outcomes public.25
We use this information to identify the reputation incentive more sharply. There are two theoretical
predictions, both embodied in Hypothesis 2b. The rst is that the decision to contribute for anonymous
developers should not be a¤ected by whether projects publish the decision because they cannot benet
from any peer-based or commercial reputation gains. However, if anonymous developers are also driven
by intrinsic motivation (including open source ideology), publishing the outcome might be viewed by
them as an extrinsic motivation device that actually crowds out their intrinsic desire to contribute to such
projects. In this case, contributions by anonymous developers should be lower for projects with public
resolution.
The second part of Hypothesis 2b is that developers who are motivated by either peer-based or
commercial reputation should be more likely to contribute to projects with public resolution than other
developers. Thus we can test whether reputation matters directly by examining whether contributions by
non-anonymous developers are higher for such projects. However, since both peer-based and commercial
(labor market) reputations can be at work, we have no a priori prediction about which types of developers
should be most sensitive to public resolution.
To study these hypotheses, we dene a dummy variable equal to one for projects that reveal the
outcome for at least 50 percent of the contributions they receive over the sample period.26 With this
threshold, 71.1 percent of the projects are identied as having public resolution. Projects that disclose
resolution tend to be larger than projects that do not (mean project sizes are 5.7 and 4.2 respectively;
mean number of contributions received are 16.1 and 7.8). We add this public resolution dummy as an
additional dimension for dening the cells for the estimation procedure, and re-estimate the baseline
specication.
Table 5 presents the results. Our earlier ndings about sorting on license type are similar to the
baseline results in Table 4. Both anonymous and open developers sort strongly on projects with highly
open licenses, while closed developers systematically target projects with less open licenses. There are
two new ndings here. First, the estimated coe¢ cient on the public resolution dummy variable is posi-
tive and statistically signicant for all developer groups, except anonymous developers. This is a direct
conrmation of the hypothesis that reputation is a motivation for contributions, and conrms Hypothesis
2b.27 Moreover, public resolution has the largest impact for open and closed developers. The estimated
25 In total, these projects receive 68,294 closedcontributions, of which 14,147 (20.7 percent) have no reported resolution,
45,844 (67.1 percent) have an Accepted resolution and the remaining 8,303 contributions get a Rejected resolution.
Overall, 67.7 percent of projects receiving contributions publish the resolution to some degree.
26We also tried two alternative thresholds 25 and 75 percent to dene the dummy variable for public resolution. The
main conclusions from this analysis are robust to the choice of the threshold, though the parameter estimates di¤er somewhat.
27The only other likely explanation for why public resolution matters for non-anonymous developers is that the decision
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coe¢ cient of 4.01 for open developers implies that they contribute about 60 percent more contributions
on average to projects with public resolution (= 4.01/6.7), while for closed developers the gure is 54
percent (= 3.15/5.8). For the other developer groups the implied increase in smaller, about 15 percent.
The second important nding is that the estimated coe¢ cient for anonymous developers is negative,
and marginally signicant, with a p-value of 0.066. These developers do not value public resolution 
which is consistent with the theoretical prediction since they do not enjoy the reputation gains. More
striking is the fact that anonymous developers are actually less likely to contribute to projects with public
resolution indicates that such publication may crowd out the intrinsic motivation underlying anonymous
contributions. This nding is robust to using alternative thresholds for classifying projects as having
public resolution.28
Corporate sponsorship
Increasingly, large rms have invested substantial nancial and technical resources in open source
development, including paying employees to participate in such projects.29 This is likely to include
sponsorship and other form of involvement with projects registered on SourceForge. Knowing which
projects have a substantial corporate involvement should help us pin down more sharply the role of labor
market signaling, as distinct from reputation associated with peer recognition. The main prediction
(Hypothesis 2c) is that developers motivated by commercial reputation in particular, closed developers
should be more likely to contribute to projects with corporate sponsorship, conditional on the license
type of the receiving project. Corporate sponsorship should have a zero e¤ect on anonymous developers
since labor market signaling plays no role for them, or a negative e¤ect if sponsorship is viewed as an
extrinsic payo¤ and crowds out of intrinsic motivation. Unless labor market reputation matters for open
developers, we expect corporate sponsorship to either have a zero e¤ect on their contributions or a negative
e¤ect if they are motivated agentswith a anti-proprietary software ideology.
Unfortunately, SourceForge does not separately identify whether a project is corporate sponsored, or
more generally the level of corporate involvement in any form. To examine this, we sent an e-mail survey
of registered members of the largest 1,000 projects (measured by number of contributions received) listed
on SourceForge to determine whether projects were initiated by for-prot companies or not-for-prot
organizations. We received responses for 217 projects, but the information only allowed us to identify
the status clearly for 93 projects.30 Therefore, to augment the usable sample, we performed extensive
to publish is a proxy for unobserved project quality. This cannot be ruled out, but in that case we would expect publishing
to induce contributions from all develper groups, including anonymous developers. The empirical results are not consistent
with this alternative explanation.
28The results in the text are based on a 50 percent threshold. Using a 25 percent threshold, the estimated coe¢ cient
(standard error) on the public resolution dummy for anonymous developers is -0.83 (0.64); with a 75 percent threshold, we
get -2.14 (0.41).
29For discussion, see Lerner and Schankerman (2010). On IBMs involvement in open source, see
http://www.research.ibm.com/journal/sj/442/capek.pdf
30The remaining responses classied projects as being initiated by individual developers, but it was not clear whether the
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manual investigation of each remaining project to identify whether there was corporate involvement,
either directly in the project or indirectly through o¤ering a proprietary product that incorporates code
from the project. Because both forms of engagement provide opportunities to developers for labor market
signaling, we classify such projects as having a corporate sponsor.We also checked whether projects
had a clear not-for-prot mission. This investigation allowed us to increase the sample to 148 projects.31
These projects are typically the larger and more active projects on SourceForge the median number
of members is 22, and these 148 projects account for about 45 percent of all contributions received in
the complete sample. The distribution of contributions by developer types and corporate sponsorship
(Table 6) shows clear sorting behavior. Anonymous developers target 86 percent of their contributions to
not-for-prot projects, while 79 percent of contributions by closed developers go to corporate sponsored
projects. Open developers favor not-for-prot projects (55 percent) but this sorting is weaker. This result
indicates some role for signaling and other labor market considerations even for open developers.32
To analyze sorting on corporate sponsorship more formally, we estimate a Probit model that relates
whether a contribution goes to a corporate project (dependent variable equal to one) or a not-for-prot
project, conditional on a set of dummy variables for developer type and receiving project characteristics.33
Table 7 summarizes the results, and conrms the pattern found in Table 6. In column 1 we include only
dummies for developer types. Closed developers are 32.4 percentage points (or 65.7 percent, evaluated
at the sample mean) more likely to contribute to corporate projects than open developers. Anonymous
developers are 36.2 percentage points (or 73.4 percent) less likely to engage with corporate projects than
open developers. In column 2 we add a control for project size and nd the same pattern of results. In
column 3 we add dummies to control for the license type of the receiving project. There is no signicant
change in the point estimates. Interestingly, the estimates also show that corporate projects are least
likely to use an HO license. Finally, in column 4 we add a full set of dummy controls for the intended
audience, programming language, and operating system of the receiving project. Even with all these
controls, we again nd the same sorting of closed developers toward corporate projects, relative to open
developers, but the magnitude is smaller by about half. In addition, with these controls there is now
no di¤erence between anonymous and open developers. The results from this analysis strongly conrm
founding developers started the project with intent to commercialize or get corporate sponsorship in the future.
31 Importantly, we did not classify projects as not-for prot as a default option. To be so classied, a project had to indcate
clearly a non-commercial intent in their mission on their website or the various online forums we examined, and there had
to be no company support (or stated intention to seek it), and no commercial products we could identify as building on the
project.
32One example of a project to which both open and closed developers contribute is Jboss. This project is incorporated
in RedHats products, such as Jboss Entreprise Middleware. Interestingly, anonymous contributors are the only type that
almost never contribute to this project, conrming their strong intrinsic motivation in favor of highly open (and non-corporate)
projects.
33We do not adopt the cell framework in this section because, despite the large number of contributions covered by the
projects in this restricted sample, the degrees-of-freedomwhich are used for cell construction dependent almost solely on
the number of receiving projects, regardless of how many contributions they receive. In the current sample, we have only
148 (mostly large) projects, which is too few to break up by bundles of project characteristics in a meaningful way.
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Hypothesis 2c.
6.4. Evidence on Reciprocity
In this section we analyze the role of reciprocity in open source innovation. Early proponents of open
source software argued that reciprocity was an important motive for developers to contribute, and one
that would be self-sustaining (e.g., Raymond, 2001). Similar claims have been made in other, so-called
gift-culture, settings. However, to our knowledge, this is the rst empirical evidence of reciprocity in
the software context. The primary hypothesis we are interested in is whether developers associated with
highly open projects those presumably most closely aligned with the open source ideology are more
likely to engage in reciprocity than other license types.
We focus on reciprocity at the project level (rather than individual contributing developer) because we
want to be able to control for matching between projects on various dimensions. We dene a contribution
from a developer who is a member of project i to project j in year t as reciprocal if project i received
a contribution from j prior to year t. We measure the degree of reciprocity as the percentage of all
contributions made by project i that go to projects which previously contributed to it.
Table 8 presents some descriptive statistics on reciprocity. Three features stand out. First, reciprocity
is rare at the project level. For the sample as a whole, only 4.9 percent of active projects (i.e., those that
receive at least one contribution) are engaged in any reciprocal contributions.34 However, these tend to be
larger projects, which account for 37 percent of total patches received. Second, closed projects are more
likely to involve reciprocity 7.5 percent for closed versus 4 percent for highly open projects. This is also
true when measured in terms of the percentage of contributions closed projects with reciprocity account
for 74.8 percent of received contributions, while it is only 20.6 percent for highly open projects. This
nding is surprising since one might think that intrinsically motivated agents, who care about open
source ideology, would be more likely to reciprocate than commercially oriented developers. The fact
that we nd the reverse strongly suggests that reciprocity also has a signaling motive for the individual
developer. Finally, while only a small minority of projects engage in reciprocity, it plays a large role
for those that do. Among those projects, 44.6 percent of all contributions made by those projects are
reciprocal, and again this is most pronounced for closed projects.
However, these two-way contributions do not necessarily reect a reciprocity motive. They may occur
because similarities between projects reduce the e¤ort cost for developers to make such contributions. To
pin down more sharply whether highly open projects are more likely to engage in reciprocity, we estimate
Probit regressions of whether a contribution is reciprocal. To control for project similarity, we include
a set of dummy variables that capture whether the contributing and receiving projects match on license
34While truncation may cause us to underestimate the occurrence of reciprocity somewhat some reciprocal contributions
may not have yet occurred within the period of observation the number is so low that we think truncation is very unlikely
to reverse this nding.
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type, programming language, operating system, and intended audience. We also control for additive
dummies for each of these dimensions.
Table 9 presents the results. Column 1 shows that reciprocity is more likely to occur when there is
matching on license type and intended audience. The impacts are substantial, especially for license type 
matching on license type raises the likelihood of reciprocity by 12 percentage points, which is 64.2 percent
of its sample mean. However, reciprocity is not a¤ected by whether there is a match on programming
language or operating system. This nding suggests that reciprocity is not primarily driven by project
similarities that reduce the cost of making contributions. These results continue to hold when we include
the size of the contributing and receiving projects (column 2).
In column 3 we look more closely at matching on license type, including separate dummy variables
for matching on di¤erent types of licenses. What is striking is that reciprocity is much higher when there
is matching on closed licenses, but there is no e¤ect when projects are matched on more open license
types. This again is inconsistent with the hypothesis that reciprocity is a major driver of contributions
for developers strongly aligned with the open source ideology. While more research on this topic is needed,
it appears from these results that reciprocity is more connected to signaling or other considerations that
are, evidently, most important to developers associated with closed projects.
6.5. Application to the Management of Open Source Projects
In previous sections we showed there is sorting behavior among contributing developers. This implies that
the choice of a projects open source license and other characteristics a¤ects the ow of contributions to
the project. For example, a more open license increases contributions by highly open developers but, at
the same time, reduces those of other developer types. Thus project manager face a trade-o¤ in selecting
these characteristics.
Lerner and Tirole (2002) emphasize the trade-o¤ that project managers face between the degree of
proprietary control and the expected number of contributions. They argue that, while more open licenses
weaken property rights over the software, such licenses presumably attract more widespread participation
among potential contributing developers. Our evidence suggests that the impact of the choice of license
is less clear-cut. More open licenses can either increase or reduce overall contributions it depends on
the sorting behavior of di¤erent types of developers. For this reason, the empirical facts about sorting
are important for open source project managers.
We illustrate this point with two examples. The rst shows how the openness of the license a¤ects
the total number of contributions received by a project. Let l !L denote the change in the number
of contributions received that occurs when license type shifts from l to L; holding all other project
characteristics constant. This will depend on how strong the sorting is between each type of developer
and project license. We can use our estimated sorting coe¢ cients from Table 4 to compute this e¤ect.
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Let dl denote the sorting coe¢ cient for developer type d and receiving project (cell) l: This gives the
expected number of contributions by all developers of type d to projects with license l; relative to the
normalized group which is contributions by open developers to projects with an HO license (HO;HO =
0):35 Then the e¤ect of changing the license from type l to L on the total expected number of contributions,
denoted by l!L; is given by l!L =
P
d(dL   dl) where the summation is over the ve di¤erent
developer groups.
Using the parameter estimates from the baseline specication in Table 4, we get the following results:
HO !C =  5:22, HO !O =  6:80; and O !C = 0:09: To illustrate the interpretation, HO !C =
 5:22 means that switching from a highly open to a closed license, holding all other project characteristics
constant, is associated with a decline of 5.22 (external) contributions. This represents a 9.2 percent
reduction in the number of external patches received, computed at the cell mean. Switching from an
highly open to an open license also reduces contributions, by about 12 percent.
These calculations indicate that, for the sample as a whole, the highly open licenses maximize the
expected number of contributions. Of course, this result does not mean that managers should always
choose highly open licenses, since these also involve constraints on the ability to appropriate commercial
returns from the project. But the computation shows that the nature of the project license can make a
real di¤erence to the ow of contributions, and thus the rate of innovation in open source software. One
should also take into account the possibility that sorting might also a¤ect the quality of contributions 
i.e., code contributions from di¤erent types of developers might have di¤erent marginal productivities In
the next section, we study this question.
In the second example, we show that the choice of license should depend on the intended audience
of the project. The reason is that the sorting behavior of di¤erent types of developers may itself vary
with this (or other) project characteristics. To analyze this, we re-estimate the baseline model separately
for projects whose intended audience is developer programing tools and end users, and use the estimated
sorting coe¢ cients to predict how the choice of license type a¤ects total contributions for each project
type. For brevity we do not report the full set of estimated parameters for each project type.36
For end-user projects, this computation yields the following results: HO !C =  5:16, HO !O =
 10:91; and O !C = 5:77: Computed at the cell mean number of contributions for end user projects,
these gures imply that moving from a highly open to a closed license reduces external contributions by
about 12.5 percent, and by about 26.4 percent if an open license were adopted. This indicates that the
35Recall that the sorting parameter captures the e¤ect of the number of potentially contributing developers of that type,
because we do not separately control for the number of developers in the regression.
36The split by intended audience substantially reduces sample size (number of distinct cells), and the estimates are less
precise than for the pooled sample reported in Table 3. Nonetheless, the results again reveal sorting by developers on license
type, but this varies by the intended audience and is less sharp than when we pool the data (this is because developers also
sort on intended audience and this is controlled for in this exercise by splitting the sample of projects). In particular, open
and anonymous developers tend to favor projects with HO licenses, especially in end-user projects, and closed developers
favor closed licenses for developer tool projects.
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highly open license maximizes the ow of contributions for end user projects. For developer tool projects,
we get HO !C = 4:00, HO !O = 8:28; and O !C =  4:28: These imply that the intermediate, open
license maximizes contributions for developer tool projects.
How do these predictions line up with the actual choices project managers make? For end-user
projects, the prediction is conrmed. In the sample, the highly open license is dominant for such projects:
87 percent have highly open licenses, with open and closed licenses accounting for only 5 and 8 percent,
respectively. However, for developer tool projects, there is a more even distribution across license types
than is predicted by our sorting coe¢ cients: 31 percent for highly open, 33 percent for open, and 36 for
closed licenses. Of course, project managers may also have other considerations in choosing a license, not
just maximizing the inow of contributions.
7. The Impact of Contributions on Project Performance
We have shown that software developers exhibit strong sorting behavior in their (external) contributions to
open source projects. In particular, developers who are members of projects are more likely to contribute
to other projects that match on the license type. As we show in the previous section, this sorting is
important for potential managers of open source projects because it means that the selection of the type
of open source license will a¤ect the expected volume and mix of code contributions received by the
project. In this section we go a step further by studying whether this matching behavior also a¤ects the
quality of the contributions received by the projects. To do this, we estimate the impact of di¤erent types
of contributions on the performance of open source projects, and then examine whether the impact is
greater when the contributing developer is matched (in terms of the license type) to the receiving project.
Beginning in 2006, SourceForge provides information that can be used to study the performance of
projects. We focus on projects that received at least one contribution over the sample period 20012010.
We were able to match about 66 percent of these projects to those used in our analysis of sorting. For
the others, either the name of the project changed or there was no available performance data. For this
analysis, we measure project performance by the number of times the project is downloaded. This is a
good indicator of the extent to which the project di¤uses among potential users and developers.37
We begin with a standard log-linear function that relates performance of a project i in year t; Yit to
the aggregate stock of contributions it receives, Sit; and a set of other control variables which we denote
by Z: The specication can be expressed as
lnYit =  lnSit + Zit + it
37We also experimented with two other measures: the number of web hits the project gets on the SourceForge site, and
the number of the projects web pages that are viewed by users registered on SourceForge (the latter measure is more likely
to capture di¤usion among software developers). The qualitative results with these alternative performance measures are
similar to those reported in this section.
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where  is a normally distributed error term where we assume to be independent of lnS and Z: In
specifying the appropriate aggregate stock of contributions, however, we do not simply add up all past
patch contributions regardless of their type. Instead, we treat di¤erent types of contributions as perfect
substitutes but allow their marginal productivities to di¤er. Specically, we use
Sit = 
J
j=1jSijt
where Sijt is the stock of contributions of type j for project i in year t:
Substituting this expression for the stock of contributions, we get the following estimating equation
for performance
lnYit =  ln (
J
j=1jSijt) + Zit + it (7.1)
The assumption that code contributions from di¤erent sources are perfect substitutes is reasonable since
they all represent the same type of input in the production (performance) function new software code
for the same program.38 We need to normalize one of the  parameters we set 1 = 1;which means that
the parameter j represents the marginal productivity of the stock of contributions of type j relative to
the marginal productivity of contributions of type one: The coe¢ cient  is the elasticity of performance
with respect to the aggregate stock of contributions.
In all of the performance regressions, we normalize the coe¢ cient on the stock of contributions from
non-member developers (the choice is immaterial and only a¤ects the interpretation of the parameters).
Each stock is computed as the cumulative number of contributions of the specied type from the projects
inception (registration date on SourceForge). In all regressions we include controls for the intended
audience, programming language, operating system, size of the project (number of members), and the
year of registration on SourceForge. We estimate this regression by nonlinear least squares, and report
standard errors clustered at the project level.
Table 9 reports the parameter estimates. In column 1 we begin with a simple specication using only
the total stock of contributions received by the project, regardless of source (including non-members).
We nd that project performance is strongly related to contributions received, with a signicant elasticity
of 0.307. This result underlines the importance of choices made by project managers that inuence the
ow of contributions, including license type and other project characteristics. In addition, performance
is positively related to the project size, and also varies across the other project characteristics used as
control variables (we strongly reject the hypothesis that these characteristics do not a¤ect performance,
p-value<.001).
However, this association between the stock of contributions and downloads hides an important di¤er-
ence. In column 2 we break down contributions into three separate stocks: internal contributions (from
38This modied Cobb-Douglas production function specication was rst used by Griliches (1986), who used it to study
the impact of basic and applied research on productivity.
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developers who are members of the same project), external contributions (from developers who do not
belong to the project), and non-member contributions made by developers who do not belong to any
SourceForge project. The result is striking while the overall elasticity is virtually unchanged, at 0.304,
the estimated marginal productivities of both internal and external contributions are much smaller than
for non-member contributions (which is normalized to unity). The estimated marginal productivity for
internal contributions is 0.344, only a third as large as for non-member developers, while the marginal
productivity for external contributions is 0.620. Despite the di¤erence in point estimates, we cannot
reject the hypothesis that internal and external patches have the same marginal productivity (p-value
=0.08), but we strongly reject that they are the same as for non-member developers.
Finally, in column 3 we disaggregate the external contributions into two groups: Matched, where the
license type of the contributing developer is the same as the receiving project, and Unmatched, where the
license type is di¤erent. The results show that Matched and Unmatched contributions have very similar
(not statistically di¤erent) marginal productivities, estimated at 0.174 and 0.169, respectively. Moreover,
these are also very similar to the marginal productivity for internal contributions, estimated at 0.222.
However, all three of these are dramatically smaller than the marginal productivity of contributions made
by non-member developers (normalized to unity).39
This analysis of project performance reveals two key facts. First, contributions do matter for project
performance. Second, while sorting behavior of developers a¤ects the ow of contributions to di¤erent
types of projects (as we showed in Section 6.1), this sorting does not a¤ect the marginal productivity of
the contributions. The one exception to this is contributions made by developers who do not belong to
any project, which have much larger impact on performance. One possible explanation for this di¤erence
is that the incentives for signaling may be greater for developers who do not belong to any projects and
that, as a consequence, they make more e¤ort in providing higher quality contributions. Unfortunately,
we cannot test this interesting hypothesis in the absence of a direct measure of the quality of code
contributions.
8. Concluding Remarks
This paper explores the role of intrinsic motivation, reputation, and reciprocity motives in driving open
source software innovation. The empirical analysis exploits a large-scale dataset with detailed information
about code contributed to open source software projects, as well on and the characteristics of contributing
and receiving projects. We study the pattern of contributions by ve distinct developer groups open,
39 In these regressions we include contributions made by anonymous developers together with highly restrictive developers,
since we found in Section 6.1 that their sorting behavior was very similar. The results are robust, however, to including a
separate stock of contributions for anonymous developers. As an additional robustness check to account for the skewness of
project downloads, we windsorized the data at both the 97th and 99th percentile and re-estimated all specications in Table
9. The results are very similar to those reported in the table.
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closed, mixed, anonymous and non-member and infer their underlying motivations from the revealed
preferenceof projects chosen.
The central nding is that developers of di¤erent types strongly sort on observed project characteristics
most notably, the openness of the license, project size, and corporate sponsorship. The empirical pattern
of sorting behavior points to an important role for (intrinsically) motivated agents, as well as reputation,
especially in terms of commercial reputation for closed developers. To a lesser extent we nd support
for the reciprocity motive in sustaining open source software innovation. Finally, we show that code
contributions a¤ect the performance (quality) of open source projects. However, contributions by non-
members seem to be a much more important determinant of quality than those made by project members.
There are two main directions for further research. The rst is to develop and estimate an empirical
framework that incorporates both the choice of license contract and the resulting sorting e¤ects  for
example, by integrating the work in this paper with the model of Lerner and Tirole (2002). A second
direction is to study in more detail how contributions from di¤erent types of developers, both members
and non-members, a¤ect the performance of open source projects, and to integrate this inquiry with
knowledge spillovers among open source contributors.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Data construction
We developed specialized web crawler software that extracts information from the SourceForge website (a
procedure that takes about a week to complete). We used two di¤erent versions of the crawler software to
implement the extraction (changes in the website format required this): November 2005 and September
2010. In each extraction we retrieved information for all projects listed on SourceForge, as well as all
relevant information for each project. This repetition of the extraction allows us to check the consistency of
information both within and across projects over time. This is important in order to address the concerns,
raised by Howison and Crowston (2004), about arbritrary dumping of information on SourceForge.
The 2005 extraction covers 77,813 projects, while our nal 2010 extraction (on which the econometric
analysis is based) includes 215,072 projects, an increase of 76.4%. In the 2005 extraction, only 4,086
projects receive at least one internal or external contribution, which is 5.3% of all registered projects. In the
2010 extraction, the corresponding gure is 3.5% of all projects. There has been a shift in the distribution
of projects across license types from 2005 to 2010, with closed licenses more heavily represented in the
later sample. The composition of the 2010 sample is as follows: 46.7% Highly Open, 9.8% Open, and
43.5% Closed. The composition in 2005 is: 68.7% Highly Open, 15.2% Open, 13.5% Closed, 2.0% Public
Domain, and 0.7% unidentied. This shift over time toward projects with closed licenses is likely to reect
the increasing involvement of corporate-sponsored open source activity.
The number of developers registered in SourceForge also increased sharply over time, from 113,191 in
2005 to 211,711 in 2010, an increase of 87.0%. Of those registered in 2005, 13.5% of developers made at
least one contribution in the 20002005 period. Of the developers registered in 2010, 12.3% made at least
one contribution in the 20002010 period.
We run checks for two distinct aspects of data consistency: 1) the risk that contributions from existing
projects are dropped by SourceForge (attrition of contributions), and 2) the risk that projects are dropped
over time by SourceForge (attrition of projects). Given that our econometric analysis focuses on the
pattern of contributions, attrition of contributions is presumably the more serious concern as it associated
with incompleteness of the history of the object of interest. The attrition may vary over time and thus
can potentially bias our results (for example, younger projects have a more complete history le, and
systematically have a di¤erent license type than older projects). In cases of project attrition, however, we
do not observe these projects in the 2010 extraction but, for those that are present, we have the complete
historical information on submission of contributions.
Before turning to the details, we summarize our ndings briey as follows. First, we nd no evidence
of contribution attrition. For the projects in the 2010 extraction, the history les are complete (i.e., there
are no contributions registered for projects in 2005 that are missing in 2010). Second, we do nd evidence
of project attrition some projects active before 2010 were dropped from SourceForge and do not appear
in the 2010 extraction. However, as explained below, we do not think that any systematic bias in our
econometric analysis is likely to be caused by this attrition.
We begin with project attrition between the two data extractions. Of the 77,813 projects registered
on SourceForge in 2005, 67% also appear in 2010. Of the active projects (those that receive at least
one contribution), the corresponding percentage is 83%. There are two main reasons why projects are
dropped from the sample over time. First, some projects were removed from SourceForge (for example,
Arkipel Project was an active project in 2005, but does not appear in SourceForge in 2010). Second, some
projects change their names, which makes it di¢ cult to identify them using automated name-matching.
These projects are not dropped from the data, and should not cause any bias in a single cross-sectional
extraction. An example of a name-changing project is ActionCube (its 2005 name), which appears under
the name AssaultCube in 2010.
We turn next to contribution attrition i.e., the extent to which code contributions are dropped from
registered projects over time. The 2005 data extraction includes 51,545 contributions, 85% of which also
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appear in the 2010 extraction. Nearly all of the contributions that do not appear in the 2010 extraction
are missing because the projects themselves have been dropped. Only 200 contributions that appear in
the 2005 data and belong to projects that are included in the 2010 data extraction are missing from the
2010 data. That is, while some projects are dropped from the sample over time, observing a project in a
given year provides a very accurate information on the history of code submission. We conclude that there
is no evidence of substantial dumpingor time-inconsistency with regard to information on contributions.
There are two main reasons why contributions are dropped through project attrition. First, several
large projects were de-activated and their activity was transferred from SourceForge to other web-
sites. For example, 55% of the dropped contributions belong to Python, which moved to the website
http://www.python.org/. However, during the period that Python appears on the SourceForge website,
we observe its complete historical and current contributions. Second, some projects, such as Scons and
Jython, do not provide access to their history in 2010, but did provide access in 2005 (e.g., the site for
Scons, http://sourceforge.net/projects/scons/develop does not provide information on submissions).
We also checked whether characteristics of the projects registered on SourceForge change over time. We
turn rst to our most important characteristic the project license type. Of the projects in 2010 that were
also registered before 2005, 93.3% have the same license type recorded at both dates. A similar pattern
holds for other project characteristics the gures for intended audience and programming language are
94.1% and 83.8%, respectively.
Denition of programming language categories
We use ve categories in the empirical analysis. The programming languages included in each are as
follows:
Object-oriented: Java, C++, Smalltalk, Visual Basic NET, C#, Object Pascal, Delphi/Kylix, Visual
Basic, Ada, D, Groovy, PL/SQL, AspectJ, COBOL, JSP, LPC, REALbasic, Visual FoxPro, Zope,
OCaml, and Simula
Imperative: C, Fortran, Standard ML, PROGRESS, and Pascal
Scriptive: JavaScript, PHP, Tcl, Rexx, ActionScript, Emacs-Lisp, VBScript, Cold Fusion, AWK, and
AppleScript
Dynamic: Perl, Python, Dylan, Erlang, Forth, Lisp, Logo, Scheme, Lua, and Modula
Objective: C, Ruby, ASP.NET, Common Lisp, Pike, Prolog, Ei¤el, REBOL, and Euler
Other: Assembly, UnixShell, ASP, Haskell, APL, MATLAB, BASIC, XBasic, Euphoria, IDL, Lab-
VIEW, XSL, and VHDL/Veril.
Denition of operating system categories
We use four categories of operating systems in the empirical analysis. Using Lerner and Tirole (2002),
Wikipedia, and http://osapa.org/wiki/index.php/SF/Freshmean Trove, we group the operating systems
into the following categories:
Microsoft : all of Microsofts operating systems (e.g., MS-DOS and WinXP)
POSIX : Linux, Solaris and BSD
Open Source independent : any independent open source operating system
Mixed : any software that operates on more than one operating system
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# Developers # Contributions
# Receiving 
Projects
Contributions per 
Developer (2)/(1)
Contributions per 
Project (2)/(3)
Project 
Membership per 
Developer
External Contributors
Anonymous NA 18,722 1,939 NA 9.7 NA
Non-members 15,133 32,293 4,071 2.1 7.9 NA
Highly restrictive 3,211 14,326 2,026 4.5 7.1 1.5
Mixed 2,308 25,802 1,784 11.2 14.5 2.9
Unrestrictive 1,860 12,569 1,356 6.8 9.3 2.0
Internal Contributors
Highly restrictive 1,184 11,213 581 9.5 19.3 1.5
Mixed 1,026 21,769 592 21.2 36.8 3.0
Unrestrictive 474 9,822 277 20.7 35.5 2.7
TABLE 1. BREAKDOWN OF CONTRIBUTIONS: DEVELOPER LEVEL
Notes: This table reports the breakdown of contributions by developer type. Developer types are as follows: Anonymous – developers who do 
not reveal their identity when making code contributions; Highly restrictive – developers who are only members of projects with highly 
restrictive licenses; Unrestrictive – developers who are only members of projects with unrestrictive licenses; Mixed – developer who are 
members of both highly restrictive and unrestrictive projects; Non-members – developers who do not belong to any project, but whose identity is 
known. Project size is defined as number of members.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mixed Non-members
License Type
Highly restrictive 81.3 67.0 37.6 45.6 57.5
Restrictive 9.9 16.9 26.0 35.0 21.2
Unrestrictive 8.8 16.2 36.4 19.4 21.3
Intended Audience
Developers 8.5 21.7 35.6 40.6 24.1
End-users/Desktop 32.6 24.0 10.2 11.0 42.7
Other 58.9 54.3 54.2 48.4 33.2
Project Size
1–5 73.1 49.3 38.4 37.9 37.7
6–10 9.2 20.0 17.7 19.4 22.5
11–50 16.9 26.6 36.9 38.1 34.8
> 50 0.8 4.1 7.0 4.6 5.0
Notes:  This table reports the distribution of code contributions by developers of different types and receiving 
project characteristics. We exclude internal contributions – contributions from developers to projects of which they 
are members. Project size is defined as number of members.
Contributing developers
TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF CODE CONTRIBUTIONS BY DEVELOPER TYPE 
AND RECEIVING PROJECT CHARACTERISTICS (%)
Anonymous 
Highly 
Restrictive Unrestrictive
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Anonymous Open Mixed Closed Non-members
Project license type:
Highly Open (HO) 2.19 0.00 0.47 -2.93** 5.08**
(2.34) (0.82) (0.46) (1.42)
Open (O) -2.20** -1.62** 0.99 -2.03** 2.10*
(0.70) (0.57) (1.18) (0.60) (1.16)
Closed (C) -2.95** -1.96** 0.59** -1.40** -2.65**
(0.38) (0.41) (0.97) (0.62) (1.07)
ln(Number of members) 2.66** 2.69** 2.97** 3.57** 3.22**
(0.45) (0.047) (0.46) (0.49) (0.42)
Average # contributions per cell 12.1 9.3 16.7 8.2 21.0
Hypotheses tests: Sorting on 
license type
H0: HR=R=UR p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001
H0: HR=UR p<0.001 p<0.001 p=0.51 p<0.001 p=0.51
Notes:  This table reports the estimated marginal effects (evaluated at the mean) on the interaction terms between the contributing 
developer type and the license type, and number of members of the receiving project. The regression includes complete sets of 
linear dummies for receiving project year of registration, intended audience, operating system, and programming language. We 
also include a linear control for the number of projects in the cell. We reject the following hypotheses: Intended Audience=0 (p-
value<0.001), Programming Language=0 (p-value<0.001), Operating Systems=0 (p-value<0.001), Size coefficients are equal (p-
value<0.001). Over-dispersion parameter estimate 3.20 (0.016). Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. ** 
significant at 1%, * significant at 5%.
Dependent variable: Number of contributions (Negative Binomial, N=7,705)
TABLE 3. BASELINE SPECIFICATION
Developer type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Anonymous Open Mixed Closed Non-members
Project license type:
Highly Open (HO) 3.56** 0.00 0.54 -2.95** 5.08**
(1.14) (0.70) (0.35) (1.23)
Open (O) -1.03** -1.39** 0.35 -2.30** 2.78*
(0.67) (0.45) (0.83) (0.45) (1.23)
Closed (C) -2.06** -1.83** 0.27 -1.72** -3.11**
(0.50) (0.36) (0.76) (0.52) (1.19)
Project intended audience:
Developer Tools -2.81** -1.47** 0.46** 2.05** -1.65**
(0.39) (0.057) (0.85) (0.72) (0.54)
End Users -1.56** 0.65** -1.28** 0.14** 0.53
(0.62) (0.99) (0.66) (0.67) (0.96)
ln(Number of members) 2.47** 2.65** 2.95** 3.58** 3.14**
(0.36) (0.030) (0.31) (0.33) (0.32)
Average # contributions per cell 12.1 9.3 16.7 8.2 21.0
Hypotheses tests: Sorting on 
license type
H0: HR=R=UR p <0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001
H0: HR=UR p<0.001 p<0.001 p=0.08 p<0.001 p<0.001
Notes:  This table reports the estimated marginal effects (evaluated at the mean) on the interaction terms between the contributing 
developer type and the license type, number of members of the receiving project, and two intended audience dummies – 
developer tools and end users. The regression includes complete sets of linear dummies for receiving project year of registration, 
intended audience, operating system, and programming language. We also include a linear control for the number of projects in 
the cell. We reject the following hypotheses: Programming Language=0 (p-value<0.001), Operating Systems=0 (p-value<0.001), 
Size coefficients are equal (p-value<0.001). Over-dispersion parameter estimate 3.17 (0.064). Standard errors are robust to 
arbitrary heteroskedasticity. ** significant at 1%, * significant at 5%.
Developer type
TABLE 4. INTENDED AUDIENCE
Dependent variable: Number of contributions (Negative Binomial, N=7,705)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Anonymous Open Mixed Closed Non-members
Project license type:
Highly Open (HO) 1.39 0.00 0.72 -2.12** 3.15**
(1.48) (0.57) (0.30) (0.79)
Open (O) -1.47** -1.12** 1.92* -1.18** 2.51**
(0.44) (0.36) (0.93) (0.47) (0.99)
Closed (C) -1.94** -1.37** 1.17** -0.74** 2.19**
(0.29) (0.29) (0.77) (0.50) (0.71)
Public Resolution -1.13* 4.01** 1.83** 3.15** 2.31
(0.62) (0.86) (0.60) (0.90) (0.49)
ln(Number of members) 2.90** 1.40** 1.81** 2.06** 2.09**
(0.34) (0.22) (0.25) (0.29) (0.21)
Average # contributions per cell 8.7 6.7 12.0 5.8 15.0
Hypotheses tests: Sorting on 
license type
H0: HR=R=UR p<0.001 p<0.001 p=0.52 p<0.001 p=0.11
H0: HR=UR p<0.001 p<0.001 p=0.27 p<0.001 p=0.27
TABLE 5. PUBLIC RESOLUTION
Dependent variable: Number of contributions (Negative Binomial, N=10,755)
Notes:  This table reports the estimated marginal effects (evaluated at the mean) of the interaction terms between the contributing 
developer type and the license type, number of members of the receiving project and a dummy for whether the receiving project 
publicly reports the outcome of code contributions. Public Resolution takes a value of one for projects that report resolution for at 
least fifty percent of the contributions they receive. We drop contributions for which a decision has not been made as of the data 
extraction date. The regression includes complete sets of linear dummies for receiving project year of registration, intended 
audience, and operating system. We also include a linear control for the number of projects in the cell. We reject the following 
hypotheses: Public Resolution coefficients equal (p-value<0.001), Intended Audience=0, Programming Language (p-
value<0.001), Operating Systems=0 (p-value<0.001), Size coefficients are equal (p-value<0.001). Over-dispersion parameter 
estimate 3.20 (0.14). Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. ** significant at 1%, * significant at 5%.
Developer type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of projects Anonymous Open Mixed Closed Non-members
Corporate Sponsorship 73 85.8 54.8 35.7 21.0 21.3
Not-for-profit 75 14.2 45.2 64.3 79.0 78.7
Total 148 12,134 5,529 11,922 10,658 5,444
TABLE 6. PATTERN OF CONTRIBUTIONS BY CORPORATE SPONSORSHIP (in percent)
Notes: This table reports the pattern of contributions for projects with strong corporate involvement (Corporate Sponsorship) and for not-for-profit projects. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dummy for developer type:
Open: base category
Anonymous
-0.362**             
(0.147)
-0.288*              
(0.135)
-0.253*               
(0.123)
-0.014                
(0.089)
Mixed 
0.339**               
(0.079)
0.278**             
(0.063)
0.198**         
(0.061)
0.165**         
(0.045)
Closed
0.324**               
(0.081)
0.274**             
(0.084)
0.227*         
(0.106)
0.144*         
(0.063)
Non-members
0.188**               
(0.072)
0.118*             
(0.062)
0.105         
(0.060)
0.111**         
(0.043)
Dummy for license type:
Highly Open: base category
Open
0.491**         
(0.112)
0.303**         
(0.122)
Closed
0.250**         
(0.148)
0.111         
(0.171)
ln(Number of members) 0.262* 0.083* 0.100**
(0.053) (0.043) (0.037)
Dummies for Intended Audience No No No Yes
Dummies for Programming Languages No No No Yes
Dummies for Operating Systems No No No Yes
R2 0.212 0.250 0.361 0.443
TABLE 7. DEVELOPER TYPE AND CORPORATE SPONSORSHIP
Dependent variable: Dummy for Contribution to Corporate Sponsored Project (N=45,687)
Notes: This table reports marginal effect estimates from (Probit) regressions for whether a code is contributed 
to a corporate project, rather that to a non-for-profit project. The dummy equals one if the contribution is to a 
corporate project, and zero if the contribution is to a non-for-profit project. Analysis is at the contribution 
level. We include only contributions to projects that we can clearly identify as either corporate or ntn-for-
profit. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through 
clustering by receiving projects. * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, and ** at the 1% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Receiving license 
type: # of projects
% of projects with 
reciprocal contributions
% of contributions 
received by reciprocal 
projects
% of contributions made 
by reciprocal projects
% of contributions from 
projects in (1) that are 
reciprocal
All 256 4.9 37.0 22.7 44.6
Highly Open (HO) 142 4.0 20.6 23.4 36.0
Open (O) 45 5.5 46.0 8.0 39.3
Closed (C) 69 7.5 74.8 52.0 50.7
TABLE 8. PATTERN OF RECIPROCITY
Notes:  This table reports the pattern of reciprocity of contributions for projects with different license types.  This table includes only projects that 
receive at least one reciprocal contribution. 
(1) (2) (3)
Dummy for matching on license type:
All licenses
0.120**      
(0.027)
0.109**    
(0.025)
Highly Open (HO)
0.031         
(0.058)
Open (O)
0.061         
(0.075)
Closed (C)
0.547**         
(0.137)
Dummy for matching on intended 
audiences
0.054**     
(0.019)
0.045**     
(0.016)
0.048**     
(0.047)
Dummy for matching on Programming 
Language
0.012         
(0.023)
-0.037                    
(0.021)
-0.035                 
(0.020)
Dummy for matching on Operating 
Systems
0.049        
(0.027)
0.030        
(0.022)
0.032         
(0.022)
ln(Number of members), receiving 0.003** 0.003
(0.001) (0.001)
ln(Number of members), contributing -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
R2 0.330 0.368 0.375
TABLE 9. DETERMINANTS OF RECIPROCITY
Dependent variable: Dummy for Reciprocity (N=5,266)
Notes: This table reports marginal effect estimates from (Probit) regressions for whether a code 
contribution is reciprocal. The dummy equals one if the contribution is reciprocal and zero 
otherwise. The dummy variable for matching on license type takes the value one if the 
contributing and receiving projects have the same license. Other matching dummies are defined 
similarly.  Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial 
correlation through clustering by receiving projects. * denotes statistical significance at the 5% 
level, and ** at the 1% level.
(1) (2) (3)
Elasticity: Total Contributions Stock 0.307**                                              
(0.007)
0.305**            
(0.007)
0.309**           
(0.008)
Marginal Productivity: Non-member 
Contributions (normalization) 1.000 1.000
Relative Marginal Productivity: Internal 
Contributions
0.344**               
(0.143)
0.222**                 
(0.065)
Relative Marginal Productivity: External 
Contributions
0.620**                       
(0.138)
Relative Marginal Productivity: Matched 
Contributions
0.174**                  
(0.033)
Relative Marginal Productivity: 
Unmatched Contributions
0.169**                      
(0.028)
ln(Number of members) 0.015** 0.015** 0.015**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Test: Marginal Productivity 
Internal=Marginal Producitivity External 
(p-value) NA 0.08 NA
Test: Marginal Productivity 
Matched=Unmatched Marginal 
Productivity (p-value) NA NA 0.88
Adjusted-R2 0.544 0.544 0.542
TABLE 10. CONTRIBUTIONS AND PROJECT PERFORMANCE
Non-linear Least Squares (N=37,833)
Notes: This "non-members" table reports estimates from nonlinear least squares regressions of the log of 
project downloads on various stocks of contributions, plus dummy variable controls for project 
characteristics including intended audience, programming language, operating system, and project 
registration year. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. ** significant at 1%, * 
significant at 5%.
Dependent variable: ln(Number of Project Downloads).                                                  
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